While Antonio De Viti de Marco was a significant figure within the Italian School of Public Finance that flourished between 1880 and 1940, his theoretical framework also has relevance today. Contemporary theory largely adopts a sequential framework where states act to modify previously established market outcomes. In contrast, De Viti worked with a framework where political and market outcomes were established simultaneously because he regarded the state as an essential productive factor within society. At the same time, however, De Viti did not treat state activity as a particular form of market activity. While he extended the logic of market exchange to state activity, he recognized the need to theorize in light of significant differences in institutional arrangements between markets and states. Collective action was guided by tax prices and not market prices. De Viti's formulation of tax prices demonstrates in turn the important place of constitutional arrangements in his theory of public finance.
wide-ranging survey of the central ideas of the Italian school. Steven Medema (2005) , and also (2009, especially Ch. 4) , relates the Italian fiscal scholarship to Knut Wicksell's (1958 [1896 ) treatment of just taxation in conjunction with modern claims about market failure and government failure. And in 348 controversial pages, Nicolò Bellanca provides a panorama of the Italian School of Public Finance starting in 1883 (with Pantaleoni) and ending in 1946 (with Borgatta), with De Viti receiving more than 20 pages. Bellanca's treatment has proven controversial, as can be seen by reading the sequence: Fausto (1995a), Bellanca (1995) , and Fausto (1995b) . Bellanca holds that De Viti's Principles is noteworthy in the public finance literature only because its fortune followed pari passu that of the Italian School of Public Finance, which is to say it shone brightly for a brief time and then disappeared. In Bellanca's words what remains of De Viti's contribution after the decline of the Italian tradition are "… only a few unfaithful, though pedagogically easily transmittable fragments: the state's typology, the idea of the state as a productive factor, the theory of public loan, his position on progressive taxation, and little else (Bellanca 1993, p. 135, our translation) ."
While we would agree with Bellanca's characterization that only specific fragments are present in the contemporary mainstream of public finance, we think all the same that De Viti's theory of public finance not only provided a framework of political economy that was creative and imaginative when it was presented but also it continues to offer good scholarly value today. Central to De Viti's theory was his treatment of the state as a productive factor within the division of labor in society, which led him to treat market and collective activity as coeval in society. This coeval treatment contrasts with the Samuelsonian-inspired (1954 Samuelsonian-inspired ( )(1955 treatment of a disjunction between private and public goods where different analytical principles underlay these disjunctive spheres of activity.
For De Viti, both private and public phenomena derive from individual needs and desires, with public needs arising only in consequence of people living in proximity to one another.
Most significantly, De Viti treats state activity and market activity as occurring simultaneously, in contrast to the customary sequential framework wherein states act upon prior market outcomes. With respect to state activity, De Viti embraced a democratic frame of reference which led him to use a contractarian style of analysis. In doing so, however, he did not treat the state as just another type of market participant because he incorporated into his analysis significant institutional differences between markets and states. While we agree with Medema (2005) that the Italian theorists sought to bring the state into the ambit of the Marginalist analysis that was underway, we would also note that they did so in a way that incorporated significant institutional differences between markets and states. De Viti's (1936, pp. 33-52) opening chapter explains both that market activity and collective activity reflect individual preferences and that collective activity is not simply another form of market activity due to conflicts of interest among members of the collectivity. As De Viti said later (1936, p, 124) : there is "a difference between Private Economics and Public Finance which has noteworthy consequences: namely, that demand and consumption coincide in Private Economics, whereas they do not coincide in Public Finance. Public goods are consumed by those who did not demand them, as well as by those who did." De Viti's recognition of an institutional distinction between market and state warrants, we believe, our treatment of De Viti as an infra-marginalist as Yang (2001) Cardini (2003) , who in Cardini (1985) presented a biography of De Viti. Also noteworthy regarding De Viti's contributions to liberalism and democracy are the essays collected in Antonio Pedone (1995) . De Viti also maintained a strong interest in the history of economic thought, as Manuela Mosca (2005) explains.
De Viti and the Italian School of Public Finance
While the Italian School of Public Finance was a significant sociological phenomenon, any collection of creative scholars will entail numerous points of difference among those scholars, as the members of the Italian School exemplified. The one point of homogeneity among the members of the Italian School was their incorporation of political institutions into fiscal analysis. For those scholars, public finance was political economy, with that compound term understood to involve a genuine integration of polity and economy. On the one hand, fiscal phenomena were to be understood in terms of such economic categories as preferences and costs. But on the other hand, the explanation of those phenomena was to be articulated in a manner congruent with the political framework through which fiscal outcomes emerged: political entities had distinctive features that set them apart from ordinary market-based entities.
With regard to this integration of political and economic activity into a single analytical framework, Wagner (2003) argues that the Italian School would have been recognized as the source of public choice scholarship had not a generation lapsed between the demise of the Italian School and the emergence of public choice. It is particularly instructive in this respect to consider Gunter Schmölders's (1960) Foreword to the German translation of Puviani (1903) : "over the last century Italian public finance has had an essentially political science character. The political character of fiscal activity stands always in the foreground. This work is a typical product of Italian public finance, especially a typical product at the end of the 19 th century. Above all, it is a science of public finance combined with fiscal politics, in many places giving a good fit with reality (Puviani 1969 (Puviani [1903 , p. 8, our translation)." It is particularly noteworthy that this translation was published about ten years before public choice began to appear as a term in academic use.
With respect to political frameworks, the Italian scholars pursued two disjunctive strands of thought, though often with individual scholars contributing to both strands. One strand was non-democratic in character, and stressed the prevalence of elites and ruling classes in political processes. This strand of thought produced much of analytical significance, and we would not want to sleight the value of this strand of thought. For instance, the theory of fiscal illusion set forth by Puviani (1897 Puviani ( )(1903 is so thorough and internally consistent that it represents an indispensable basis for a genuine understanding of the public finances in democratic regimes, as Vitaletti (1996) recognizes.
Steve's reference to precursors warrants one final remark before entering the substance of our paper. De Viti wrote in Italian, on subjects and with methods outside the mainstream of his discipline. His Principles is a marvel of scholarship. Yet, the language barrier has given rise to adverse selection, and in two forms, one relating to the translation 
Marginalism vs. the Infra-marginal Character of the Italian School
Until about the mid-eighties of the nineteenth century when De Viti was beginning his scientific career, the Marginalist school was commonly assumed to be synonymous with economic science in Italy, as Barucci (1972) and private use of an income unit is an opportunity cost calculation at an individual level, which, however, has to be aggregated. Yet, the absence of a political market as an aggregating mechanism gave rise to Wicksell's negative reaction to Mazzola. Wicksell's critique could not have been extended to De Viti who wrote (1936, p. 114): "There is no doubt that our income is the index by which we measure the total of our consumption, present and prospective, individual and collective. It is axiomatic that we consume in proportion to income. But this proportion, true for the whole, may not be true for the part".
De Viti fully realized, among other things, that in democracies choices are majoritarian in nature. He concluded that the equilibrium resulting from public choices holds at some aggregate level but not at each individual's level in the community. Since choices are made within a political process and not at an individual level, the logic of a utility chain is broken unless one imposes to an utterly abstract framework. In place of such abstraction,
De Viti introduces a model of the co-operative state as a limiting case where unanimity allows extension of the logic of market exchange to politics, while also recognizing that absent unanimity no state could be fully co-operative.
There are two theoretical snares that the participants in the Italian School sought to avoid. One snare, which caught Mazzola, was to treat state activity as fundamentally indistinct from market activity. If market allocation is explained with reference to cost and demand, so is political allocation. This snare fuses taxing and spending into one unified operation, with collective action being just one particular reflection of market interaction.
This snare is illustrated nicely by various claims to the effect we get what we want through democratic processes, ignoring the simple observation that a "we" can't do anything or sense anything. This snare is reflected in quite a number of recent works on political economy, including Becker (1983) , Wittman (1989 Wittman ( )(1995 , Persson and Tabellini (2000) , and Besley (2006) , that argue that political processes have the same or at least closely similar Pareto-efficiency properties as market processes. At base, these various formulations assimilate political action to the logic of choice, in contrast to treating political action as a process of interaction within some particular institutional or parliamentary framework. Yet a parliament is not a sentient creature: it is a "we," and a "we" can't choose. To be sure, we speak of collective bodies choosing all the time, but behind that speech lays recognition of structured interaction among participants. A measure enacted by a parliamentary assembly stands at the end of a parliamentary process that governs the interactions among the members of parliament. Taxation converts private property to collective control, but the precise character of that control and how it is used will be governed by the parliamentary rules that govern relationships among the members of parliament.
The second snare dominated Anglo-Saxon public finance but did not catch the theorists of the Italian School. This snare is to treat taxation as a type of uncaused cause.
Taxes are somehow inserted into a society and their uncaused insertion can be appraised against two metrics: excess burden and ability to pay. The excess burden notion treats a tax as if it were a hailstorm that imposes nothing but losses. 2 With taxes conceptualized in this manner, a comparison of taxes in terms of their excess burdens becomes an intellectually intelligible activity. Excess burden provides the analytical point of departure for the literature on optimal taxation, and likewise pervades notions of taxation based on ability-to-pay. Since for the ability-to-pay principle the expenditure side is immaterial, equity can be pursued only through taxation as described by the various sacrifice theories.
These theories of taxes as unchosen impositions stood outside De Viti's frame of reference, for that frame of reference sought not to advise some fictional despot, benevolent or otherwise, but to explain how different institutional frameworks promoted or impeded the activities of what was regarded as a cooperative state. A monarch or despot may stand outside the system over which he rules, but there is no such outside position in a democratic polity. A tax cannot be imposed on everyone. At least some people must choose the tax, and must do so because the combination of less market output and more political output generates a higher level of utility for them. Without doubt, taxation also generally involves a good number of people in paying for output they do not value, or value less than the sacrificed market output the tax makes necessary. Those people are burdened directly by the tax, and then again as they rearrange their market conduct in response to the tax extractions imposed on them. Still, there is no readily sensible 2 The expression "hailstorm tax" (imposta grandine in Italian) was coined by Luigi Einaudi. With this expression, Einaudi criticized those economists who treated revenues independent of expenditures. When public expenditure is ignored, taxation performs a negative role in the economy that is wholly comparable to the devastating effect of hailstorm on crops. only they didn't extend that explanation fully to political-or tax-prices because they recognized that not all individuals would have their preferences fully satisfied through collective action even though collective action was responsive to individual preferences. It is this unwillingness to engage in full and perfect extension that leads us to describe them as theorists of the infra-marginal. Yang uses the term infra-marginal to describe a concern with total conditions, in contrast to the customary concern with marginal conditions only.
De Viti did not reject a concern with marginal conditions, but only regarded that concern as insufficient for explaining collective action, so we describe him as an infra-Marginalist to denote the disjunction between markets and states that characterized De Viti and the Italian School.
In 1888, two years before the publication of Mazzola's book, De Viti published Il
Carattere Teorico dell'Economia Finanziaria. In that small book, De Viti set forth the theoretical framework, the elaboration of which he worked on the remainder of his scholarly life, recalling also that he spent a good deal of that time engaged as a member of the Italian parliament. De Viti's approach to the theory of public finance was not congruent with the Marginalist view of the state. We would note, however, that this incongruity was not due to any rejection of marginal utility principles applied to value and choice but rather was due to his recognition that those principles could not be applied straightforwardly to fiscal phenomena and political processes. De Viti embraced the claim that the principles of utility and cost apply to the conduct of state activity, while at the same time recognizing that they must play out differently within states than within markets as a result of the different settings for individual interaction.
De Viti did not conceptualize a market equilibrium to which state activity is subsequently added. In this rejection of a sequential style of theorizing in favor of a simultaneous style, De Viti took an alternative path from some of the newer work on political economy represented by Persson and Tabellini (2000) , Drazen (2000) and Besley (2006) . For De Viti, the state was a necessary input into all productive activity: market production was impossible without state activity; likewise, state activity requires inputs created through market activity. To achieve a sort of semantic consonance with Sraffa's (1960) notion of basic goods, De Viti's state could be defined as a "basic factor" that was ever present in private goods and services, though it was not as tangible and easily identifiable as land, capital and labor. It was, in fact, a pervasive institutional or organizational factor. Even though the semantic consonance with Sraffa accounts for the state as an essential factor, that consonance also hides an equally important component of De Viti's conception of the state, namely the non-objectivity of the productive contribution involved: after all, De Viti embraced the value principles of the marginal theorists, only thought that they played out differently in political than in market settings.
The parallel of De Viti's concept of the state as productive factor with Sraffa's basic goods is justified with the analogous role that the concept plays in the two analytical constructions. Specifically, in the De Viti case each unit of income has a tax inborn in it, and a tax so conceived logically equals basic goods. Such built-in tax has a general value because no income unit can be produced without it. This said, all other differences remain, especially Sraffa's contention that basic goods, despite the role that they play, are private in nature and are dependent on the production techniques, not on political decisions. As one of the referees has remarked, this parallelism can be viewed as a weak point, but we think that the similarity is appropriate all the same from the heuristic point of view.
A Constitutional Typology of State Forms
De Viti viewed the state as a necessary organizational factor within a society, but he also recognized that states could take on different forms. In his original 1888 book, De Viti set forth three different constitutional forms for state activity, each of which would involve different relationships between state and market, and yet any of which would entail simultaneous activity within the respective precincts of state and market. These three forms were described by De Viti as:
1) tutorial-altruistic;
2) monopolistic-egoistic; and 3) co-operative. (2006) explores. Buchanan (1960) advances the cooperative-monopolistic duality in theories of state as the distinguishing element in the Italian School of Public Finance; moreover, he used this duality to create a watershed between Italian fiscal theorizing and the Anglo-Saxon fiscal tradition. This duality is theoretical and categorical and is not meant to apply cleanly and concisely to reality, where some combination of forms is possible. A cooperative state maps into a notion of a polycentric polity, whereas the monopolistic state maps into a model of a monocentric polity (Ostrom 1997) . Even a polycentric polity may contain some nodes that are relatively free from competitive challenge. Similarly, a monocentric polity might contain other nodes of potential contestation that cannot be eliminated and so must be accommodated. Political power is never truly absolute, but neither is it ever nonexistent.
For De Viti, the cooperative state represented an ideal state wherein state activity would be organized in such a way that those activities conferred gains on all affected parties, in sharp distinction to conferring gains on some while imposing losses on others. It is the contractual vision of the state rather than Einaudi's subsequent analytical justifications, that makes the so-called "hailstorm tax" incompatible with De Viti's theoretical framework. The "hailstorm tax", in fact, is conceived as a tax stemming from a non-democratic political setting where citizens and the state are morally unequal. More generally, the logic of a tax-price is incompatible with all versions of the sacrifice theory and, hence, with the ability-to-pay principle, the success of which can, as already mentioned, be best ascribed to its ambiguities.
In a nutshell, De Viti's dualism is of the institutional kind. His monopolistic state, which is the polar alternative to his cooperative state, mimics the Hobbesian context lato sensu. This is why De Viti paid little direct attention to the monopolistic state. He conceived of it as a latent institutional alternative that was always capable of invading and eroding the co-operative state. While monopolistic elements can invade the co-operative state, De Viti stressed an opposing direction of relationship: the contractual constitution on which the cooperative state rests can be a process that offers resistance to elements of the absolute or monopolistic state. This possible source of resistance to the intrusion of monopolistic elements was the ground on which De Viti gave tax-price a central place in the decisionmaking process on matters of public finance. The whole decisional scenario in the cooperative state is conceived by De Viti as being made-up of two separated, although related, contracts, as emphasized in particular by Sergio Steve (1997) , and to which we shall now turn.
Market Prices, Tax Prices, and State Action
De Viti distinguished between two types of state activity: those services that were divisible in consumption and those that were not. To be sure, this distinction parallels the distinction between private and public goods that Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( )(1955 Samuelson and most subsequent economic analysis has defined public goods objectively by the equal-consumption condition, De Viti defined collective wants subjectively and in emergent fashion. Collective wants were wants that arose among people in consequence of their living in proximity to one another. Some of those wants might be supplied through market processes, but others would be supplied through political processes. In speaking of collective wants, De Viti most certainly did not attribute some sentient quality to states.
What he denoted as collective wants were emergent qualities of interactions among people living in relatively close proximity to one another. A set of people living independently of one another would have their individual wants; should all of those people subsequently come to live in proximity with one another, new wants would develop, which
De Viti described as collective wants.
It doesn't follow that those collective wants would be supplied by states, for they could be supplied through market processes. But De Viti's object of interest was state activity, which he treated as stemming from the presence of collective wants. De Viti's notion of a collective want, however, does not correspond to Samuelson's equalconsumption condition: it can correspond to this condition, but such correspondence isn't necessary. A collective want may be shared by everyone within a society, but it could be shared only by some members of a society. To treat this difference between all and some,
De Viti distinguished between two forms of contract within the contractual orientation required by his framework of a co-operative state. One form of contract pertained to wants held by some, while the other form pertained to wants held by all. For contracts of the first form, market prices were suitable for financing collective activity; for contracts of the second form, tax prices were the suitable instrument.
Bus service might illustrate a service of the first or specific form. In this case the fiscal principle is the same as the market principle. To describe the fiscal principle as being identical with the market principle for specific goods and services does not imply that states actually will operate in this manner. The market principle applied to specific goods provided by governments requires that consumers support those services through the prices they pay. In this respect, De Viti insisted that fiscal prices should cover the cost of providing specific services. This insistence, however, was advanced as a theoretical point, and there are plenty of reasons why different prices might be put in place through political processes that contained monopolistic elements even within a generally co-operative state. For instance, riders might receive subsidized service made possible by taxes imposed on non-riders. Whether this might actually happen, or to what extent it might happen, depends in turn on the constitutional framework that governs state budgeting. The distinction between specific and general services is theoretically clear, but as a matter of actual practice it is possible for slippage to occur wherein specific services are financed to some extent by tax prices and not market prices. Within the constitutional framework of a purely co-operative state this would not happen, but De Viti also recognized that some monopolistic elements would always be present.
De Viti's primary interest rested with general and not specific collective wants. He thought that specific services could be financed through market prices in principle even if the world of practice gave different results. When it came to general services, De Viti recognized that market prices could not be used and so advanced tax prices to represent the contract between the community of taxpayers and the state. In the case of a general collective want, individual demands cannot be revealed through choices, in contrast to the ability of people to reveal demands by choosing how often to ride a bus. General services must be financed by tax prices because they can't be financed by market prices. But how are these tax prices to be determined? And what does it matter which kind of determination is made?
De Viti recognized that any such determination must be arbitrary. To call such a determination arbitrary is not, however, to say that such determination is ungrounded in principle. For De Viti tax prices were grounded in the principle represented by the cooperative state. This principle, in turn, is reflected in the benefit principle of public finance.
But how should the benefit principle be carried forward in actual practice in light of the problems of free riding that were known to De Viti? People can't be asked reliably to place values on state activity because this could be done only for specific goods and services.
What must be done instead is to make some reasonable presumption about individual demands. To construct this presumption, De Viti (1936, pp.35-36 and 111 ff.) advances two presumptive hypotheses:
(1) All members of the community consume general services for the survival of the community itself (think, for example, of the constitution of a state, its external defense, and its domestic security.)
The individual income produced can be taken as the best proxy for that individual's demand of public goods.
Using marginal utility theory to fix prices for general public goods was to De Viti both impossible and necessary. It was impossible because such goods could not be supplied through market transactions, and without market transactions it would be impossible for people genuinely to reveal their demands for those services, as distinct from, perhaps, participating in cheap-talk types of opinion surveys. It was necessary because the consonance of state activity with those demands was the raison d'être of the co-operative state. In this situation, De Viti's second presumption above led him to claim that a proportional tax on income would create a tax price that supported the co-operative state.
This claim stems from De Viti's view that general public services are necessary inputs for market-based production. With the state being an essential factor of production, each unit of income has a built-in tax liability that in the aggregate is sufficient to finance those general services.
The co-operative state thus requires that a state's general services, as distinct from its specific services, be financed by a proportional tax on all income. In contemporary terms, this would be a flat-rate tax on a comprehensive definition of income because the logic of the co-operative state required an equal tax liability per unit of income. There is no principled reason for claiming that liability was associated with only some units of income, which meant in turn that there could be no exemptions from the tax base. Were exemptions to be created so that some units of income were to escape taxation, the logic of the co-operative state would be violated through a set of discriminatory tax prices. Such a digressive tax would violate the logic of the co-operative state. De Viti was aware of the claims of the sacrifice theories that were often used to support tax exemptions, but these theories were incoherent with reference to the co-operative state. De Viti's call for a proportional tax on all units of income does not, of course, close off all points of controversy about income taxation because income must still be defined in a way that can be administered. Still, what is revealed in De Viti's analysis of taxation and tax pricing is his effort to treat taxation not in some ruling class motif of using taxes to punish and reward but in a contractual motif that is suitable for a society of moral equals governed by rule-of-law principles.
Tax Pricing, Economic Calculation and Public Finance
It is well recognized that economic organization on a large scale is impossible without markets and prices. Without prices, it is impossible to engage in economic calculation on anything other than the small scale associated with barter. one-half of citizens of voting age face no tax liability under the personal income tax. To be sure, the income tax is not the only source of tax prices within the American fiscal system, but it is a major source. The polar case of the co-operative state that assumes all political decisions are taken under unanimous consent. De Viti was aware of the limitations of this formulation, as illustrated by his recognition that in real-world fiscal systems increases in public expenditures will be demanded by those who do not pay for taxes, and with other taxpayers being in the opposite situation.
It was De Viti's ambition to eliminate this conflict that led him to articulate the place of tax prices within a co-operative state. This alternative perspective replaced the purely normative focus of the ability-to-pay principle with a more positive focus that takes into account how the state acts in reality. In this alternative perspective, the logic of the taxprice -although divorced from the marginal utility theory -emerges once again. In this context, it is necessary to search for a mechanism representing the closest substitute for price. A genuine price mechanism cannot work in a world of indirect "presumptive"
demands. But when public services are general, one has to face the problem of how to determine an appropriate tax-price. A proportional income tax, which would charge the same tax bill to each unit of income generated, would also indirectly determine the level of public services through the role that tax-prices play in the political process.
Conclusions
We conclude where we began: the Italian School of public finance -specifically in the democratic version exemplified by the work of De Viti de Marco -is of both historical interest and contemporary relevance. The central analytical orientation of the Italian School stresses the simultaneous character of private and collective action, which in turn leads to an entangled vision of political economy in place of the prevalent treatment of separated spheres of political and economic activity. Within this analytical framework, economic calculation is as much a problem for the collective organization of economic activity as it is for the market organization of such activity. Where market activity can rely upon market prices to guide the organization of economic activity, collective activity must be organized through tax prices. The form that tax prices take influences the character of state activity. De Viti's vision of the co-operative state was based on a principle of equality before law and required that general services of state be financed by a proportional tax claim against all units of income.
The creation of other systems of tax pricing, such as characterizes real-world tax systems today, necessarily expands the presence of monopolistic tendencies within the state. While as a theoretical matter the cooperative-monopoly duality described antipodal conceptual options, as a practical matter we are faced with an institutional admixture of cooperative and monopolistic elements. De Viti's constitutionally relevant claim was that the type of mixture between these elements could be influenced by the type of tax system used to finance general collective activities. A proportional tax on all units of income would support the cooperative state because it would work against the use of discriminatory taxation to award those favored by monopolistic positions within the state. More than a century ago the members of the Italian School recognized that the study of public finance requires an explicit attention to politics. This is a point that mainstream Anglo-Saxon public finance has really begun to acknowledge only with the rise of public choice scholarship within the last thirty years or so, as illustrated in exemplary fashion at the textbook level by Cullis and Jones (2009) .
